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I. INTRODUCTION 
Virtues are lost in self-interest as rivers are lost in the sea.1  This 
maxim is particularly relevant to majority interest holders in non-
corporate entities who lose their virtues in self-interest by completely 
removing minority interest holders from an entity.  The vehicle typically 
employed to accomplish this task is the squeeze-out merger.  In a 
squeeze-out merger, minority interest holders receive a cash amount 
determined by the majority interest holder and are effectively squeezed 
out of ownership in the surviving entity.2 
Minority shareholders in corporations who object to this process 
normally can employ one of two protective devices: (1) appraisal rights; 
or (2) damages stemming from a breach of fiduciary duty.3  Although 
generally incapable of rescinding a squeeze-out merger, these two 
devices always ensure a judicially determined fair price for the minority 
shareholders cashed-out shares. 
These rights available in corporate squeeze-out mergers, however, 
are not as apparent in non-corporate squeeze-out mergers.  In Welch v. 
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 1. Francois VI, Duke de La Rochefoucauld, The Maximes, available at http://www.britannica. 
com/eb/article-4018 (Translated from French). 
 2. See, e.g., Hesston Corp. v. Kays, 870 P.2d 17, 2022 (Kan. 1994) (providing an example of 
a squeeze-out merger). 
 3. See infra Part IV.B (discussing corporate fiduciary principles in the context of squeeze-out 
mergers). 
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Via Christi Health Partners, Inc.,4 the Kansas Supreme Court analyzed a 
squeeze-out merger between a limited partnership and a limited liability 
company.  Squeezed-out limited partners brought suit after the merger 
claiming the price they received for their cashed-out shares was too low.  
They attempted to employ the two protective devices normally utilized in 
corporate squeeze-out mergers to receive a judicially-determined fair 
price.5 
After searching through the Mixed Entity Merger statutes,6 the 
Kansas Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (KRULPA)7 and the 
Kansas Uniform Partnership Act (KUPA),8 the Kansas Supreme Court 
determined the limited partners were not entitled to appraisal rights.9  
Moreover, the court concluded that Via Christi Health Partners, Inc. 
(Via Christi), the sole general partner of the limited partnership who 
controlled both entities, did not breach its fiduciary duty to the limited 
partnership.10 
Part II of this Comment will begin by briefly summarizing the 
Kansas Supreme Courts analysis in Welch v. Via Christi Health 
Partners, Inc.  Part III will discuss why the Kansas Supreme Court was 
correct in concluding the merger orchestrated by Via Christi did not 
create appraisal rights.  Part IV will evaluate the courts fiduciary duty 
analysis, separating the discussion into four parts: first, an examination 
of the codified fiduciary duties in section 56a-404 of the Kansas Statutes 
Annotated; second, an overview of corporate fiduciary principles; third, 
an application of corporate fiduciary principles to partnership law; and 
lastly, a determination that Via Christi should have been required to 
establish a fair merger price under the strict fairness test to avoid 
breaching its fiduciary duty.  This Comment concludes that had Via 
Christi been required to demonstrate a fair merger price, the squeezed-
out limited partners would have been ensured a judicially-determined fair 
price for their cashed-out interests.  In other words, a partner in a 
partnership, like a minority shareholder in a corporation, would be 
protected should a controlling partner lose his virtues in self-interest. 
                                                     
 4. 133 P.3d 122 (Kan. 2006). 
 5. Id. at 12627. 
 6. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7701 to 7708 (1995). 
 7. Id. §§ 56-1a01 to 1a610. 
 8   Id. §§ 56a-101 to 1305. 
 9. Welch, 133 P.3d at 14445. 
 10. Id. 
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II. SUMMARY OF WELCH V. VIA CHRISTI HEALTH PARTNERS, INC. 
A. Facts of Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc. 
MR Imaging Center, L.P. (MR Imaging Center), a medical 
imaging business, was formed in Kansas on September 17, 1985.11  Via 
Christi served as the sole general partner in MR Imaging Center and held 
a 71% ownership interest.12  Various doctors held the remainder of the 
ownership interest.13 
In 2002, Via Christi embarked on a course it anticipated would lead 
to the merging of MR Imaging Center into a new entity.14  Via Christi 
enlisted Paragon Health Capital Corporation (Paragon) to conduct an 
appraisal of MR Imaging Center.15  Additionally, Via Christi arranged 
for itself and other persons it selected to acquire the medical imaging 
business conducted by [MR Imaging Center] through a squeeze-out 
merger.16  The other persons Via Christi selected to be part of the 
merger had strong ties to Via Christi.17  For example, the affiliates of the 
selected persons had been substantial contributors to the Via Christi 
Foundation, a charitable affiliate of [Via Christi].18 
Via Christi created a limited liability company, MRI, LLC, for the 
purpose of consummating the merger.19  Via Christi controlled and 
owned 64.2% of MRI, LLC.20  On July 15, 2003, Via Christi sent the 
limited partners a Notice of Special Meeting of the partners of MR 
Imaging Center.21  This notice provided that the limited partners would 
be asked to approve (a) an amendment to the Agreement of Limited 
Partnership to permit MR Imaging Center[] to merge with another 
general or limited partnership, corporation, or limited liability company, 
and (b) the merger agreement between MR Imaging Center[] and MRI, 
LLC . . . in which Via Christi also held a controlling interest.22  The 
                                                     
 11. Id.at 125. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Brief of Appellants at 2, Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., No. 04-92867-A (Kan. 
Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2004). 
 15. Welch, 133 P.3d at 126. 
 16. Brief of Appellants, supra note 14, at 3. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Welch, 133 P.3d at 126. 
 20. Id. at 125. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Brief of Appellees at 3, Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., 133 P.3d 122 (Kan. 
2005) (No. 04-92867-AS). 
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notice further stated each partners interest would be redeemed for 
$78,408 per unit.23  At the insistence of Via Christi and its legal 
counsel, the value determined by Paragon did not take into account 
minority interest and marketability discounts.24  As a result, all 
partnersmajority and minoritywould receive the same price for each 
unit of the limited partnership when the merger occurred.25 
On July 31, 2003, the amendment to the partnership agreement and 
the merger agreement were approved.26  Only Via Christi voted in favor 
of the amendment and the merger.27  Following the merger, nine limited 
partners owning approximately 15% of MR Imaging Center brought suit 
against MR Imaging Center and Via Christi.28  The limited partners 
sought enforcement of their [appraisal] rights as dissociated partners 
and damages for breach of fiduciary duties, including damages for [Via 
Christis] undervaluation of the limited partnership for purposes of the 
merger.29  An appraiser hired by the plaintiffs valued each unit of the 
limited partnership at $111,537.30 
B. The Kansas Supreme Courts Decision 
1. The Squeeze-Out Merger Did Not Create Appraisal Rights 
The Kansas Supreme Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs 
could invoke appraisal rights.  The court began its analysis by 
recognizing that the Mixed Entity Merger statutes contain authority 
governing mergers between domestic limited partnerships and domestic 
limited liability companies.31  The court concluded that the Mixed Entity 
Merger statutes do not create appraisal rights.32  The plaintiffs, however, 
contended that the Mixed Entity Merger statutes do not impair appraisal 
rights provided by KRULPA or KUPA because of section 17-7707(k) of 
                                                     
 23. Id. 
 24. See Welch, 133 P.3d at 145 (noting discovery showed no evidence that Via Christi acted in 
anything other than an above-board manner). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 126. 
 27. Brief of Appellants, supra note 14, at 56. 
 28. Welch, 133 P.3d at 12526. 
 29. Brief of Appellants, supra note 14, at 7. 
 30. Welch, 133 P.3d at 126. 
 31. See id. at 129 (The plaintiffs and the defendants seem to agree that the merger between 
MR Imaging Center, L.P., and MRI, LLC, is governed by this statutory authority.). 
 32. See id. at 130 ([T]hese statutes do not themselves grant statutory appraisal or buyout 
rights). 
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the Kansas Statutes Annotated,33 which preserves any dissenters 
appraisal shares or their equivalent rights that may otherwise be 
available outside the Mixed Entity Merger statutes.34 
Via Christi argued the doctrine of independent legal significance 
precluded a search for appraisal rights outside of the Mixed Entity 
Merger statutes, but the court determined section 17-7707(k) specifically 
preserves any appraisal or equivalent rights which may otherwise be 
available to the limited partners in this case.35  Thus, the court shifted its 
analysis to whether the provisions of KRULPA or KUPA provide for 
statutory appraisal or buyout rights to [] limited partner plaintiffs.36 
With the analysis shifted to KRULPA and KUPA, the plaintiffs 
argued that the squeeze-out merger caused them to become dissociated, 
and because their dissociation did not result in dissolution or winding up 
of the partnership business, they were entitled to appraisal rights under 
KUPA.37  Via Christi countered that one does not reach or use [KUPA] 
for dissociation resulting from withdrawal because withdrawal of a 
limited partner is specifically provided for in [KRULPA].38  The court 
rejected Via Christis argument, finding that the plaintiffs never sought 
to withdraw from the limited partnership . . . .  Rather, the question to be 
resolved under this issue is whether KRULPA provides any appraisal or 
buyout rights to involuntarily dissociated limited partners of a limited 
partnership following a merger with a limited liability company.39  
Further, the court stated that section 56-1a604 provides: [i]n any case 
not provided for in [KRULPA], the provisions of [KUPA] and 
amendments [sic] thereto shall govern.40  Thus, the absence of any 
authority concerning the appraisal rights of an involuntary dissociated 
partner after a merger requires [the court] to examine the provisions of 
KUPA . . . .41 
The courts analysis then moved to the following provisions of 
KUPA: sections 56a-701, 56a-601, and 56a-906(e).  Section 56a-701 
entitles a dissociated partner to statutory appraisal rights.42  Section 
56a-601 provides a list of events causing a partners dissociation, 
                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7707(k) (2005). 
 35. Welch, 133 P.3d at 130. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 13031. 
 38. Id. at 131. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 130 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a604 (2005)). 
 41. Id. at 132. 
 42. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-701 (2005). 
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including a partners expulsion pursuant to the partnership agreement.43  
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) Official Comment to 
section 601 provides: Section 601 enumerates all of the events that 
cause a partners dissociation.44  Section 56a-906(e), located under 
Article 9 Conversions and Mergers, expressly provides that 
[a] partner of a party to a merger who does not become a partner of the 
surviving partnership or limited partnership is dissociated from the 
entity, of which that partner was a partner, as of the date the merger 
takes effect.  The surviving entity shall cause the partners interest in 
the entity to be purchased under K.S.A. 56a-701 . . . .45 
The court quickly rejected the contention that the squeeze-out merger 
caused the plaintiffs to be expelled under section 56a-601(c), noting that 
expulsion is not equivalent to a squeeze-out merger.46  Additionally, 
the court stated that no provision in the limited partnership agreement 
suggested that an expulsion under KUPA took place.47 
The court next faced an apparent ambiguity between the Official 
Comment to RUPA 601 and section 56a-906(e).  Via Christi asserted that 
because the Official Comment to RUPA 601 states that all the events 
of a partners dissociation are covered in RUPA 601, section 56a-906(e) 
does not create a separate basis for dissociation.48  The plaintiffs 
countered that, despite this comment, the express language of both 
sections provides otherwise.49 
While acknowledging the persuasiveness of both parties arguments, 
the court decided that section 56a-906(e) did not apply to the current 
transaction because the provision only pertains to mergers between 
partnerships in which there is a surviving partnership or limited 
partnership.50  The court emphasized that MRI, LLC survived the 
merger, which was neither a partnership nor a limited partnership.51  
Moreover, the court noted that Kansas has not adopted Official Comment 
601 of RUPA.52  As a result, the court held the plaintiffs could not utilize  
 
                                                     
 43. Id. § 56a-601(c). 
 44. REVISED UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 601 cmt. 1 (2006). 
 45. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-906(e) (emphasis added). 
 46. Welch, 133 P.3d at 133. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 134. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 13435. 
 51. Id. at 135. 
 52. Id. at 134. 
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section 56a-701 of KUPA, and thus, the merger did not create appraisal 
rights.53 
2. The Court Determined Via Christi Did Not Breach Its Fiduciary 
Duty to the Limited Partners 
The court began its fiduciary duty analysis by citing section 56-
1a253(a) of KRULPA: Except as provided in this act or in the 
partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited partnership has the 
rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a partner in a 
partnership without limited partners.54  The court determined that the 
fiduciary duties of a general partner in a limited partnership are found in 
section 56a-404 of KUPA.55 
Before deciding whether Via Christi had breached its section 56a-
404 fiduciary duty, the court addressed the parties arguments involving 
fiduciary duty and burdens of proof in corporate squeeze-out mergers.  
The court stated that before reliance [on corporate burdens of proof and 
fiduciary duty standards] may be had, accommodation must be made for 
important differences between partnerships and corporations.56  One 
important difference noted by the court was that in the corporate context, 
a member of the board of directors is a true trustee, while a partner in a 
partnership is not a true trustee because section 56a-404(e) of KUPA 
[authorizes] a partner to pursue his or her own interest.57  Section 56a-
404(e) of KUPA provides that [a] partner does not violate a duty or 
obligation under this [A]ct or under the partnership agreement merely 
because the partners conduct furthers the partners own interest.58  
Based on this distinction coupled with a review of Kansas corporate self-
interest cases, the court determined that the plaintiffs must establish 
something above and beyond self-interest or self-dealing in this case 
involving a limited partnership in order to shift the burden of proof 
regarding the fairness of the transaction to the defendants.59  In the 
courts view, this burden shifting could be accomplished one of two 
ways: by establishing a prima facie case of a breach of a fiduciary duty 
                                                     
 53. Id. at 13536. 
 54. Id. at 136 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a253(a) (2005)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 138. 
 57. Id.  See also id. at 141 (stating that the term fiduciary duties in section 56a-404 is 
misleading because a partner may legitimately pursue self-interest instead of solely the interest of 
the partnership and the other partners as must a true trustee). 
 58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(e) (2005). 
 59. Welch, 133 P.3d at 139. 
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under K.S.A. 56a-404 . . . [or by] establish[ing] specific acts of fraud, 
misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct.60 
After determining the parties fiduciary duties and burdens of proof, 
the court analyzed whether the plaintiffs had established a prima facie 
breach of fiduciary duty under section 56a-404.  As previously 
mentioned, the court noted that this provision sets forth the fiduciary 
duties of a general partner.61  Subsection (a) provides that [t]he only 
fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners 
are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) 
and (c).62  Subsection (b) states: 
A partners duty of loyalty . . . is limited to the following: (1) [t]o 
account to the partnership . . . any property, profit, or benefit derived by 
the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or 
derived from a use by the partner of partnership property . . . ; (2) to 
refrain from dealing with the partnership . . . on behalf of a party 
having an interest adverse to the partnership; and (3) to refrain from 
competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership 
business before the dissolution of the partnership.63 
The plaintiffs argued Via Christi violated its duty of loyalty under 
sections 56a-404(b)(1) and (2) by appropriating the benefits of the 
partnership business for themselves and for others of their choosing in 
the merger and by dealing with the partnership as or on behalf of a 
party . . . having an adverse interest to the partnership.64  Via Christi 
countered that it did not appropriate the financial returns and benefits of 
the plaintiffs interests to itself; rather, its interest in the surviving entity 
was actually reduced from a 71% owner of the limited partnership to a 
64.2% owner of the MRI, LLC.65  To further bolster its argument, Via 
Christi pointed out that Paragons appraisal placed the same value on all 
of the interests in the partnership and that the plaintiffs erroneously 
focus[ed] on whether their individual interests were in conflict with or 
adverse to the defendants, when the statute [section 56a-404] sets forth 
specific fiduciary duties to the partnership rather than to the individual 
partners, and that no evidence was presented that MRI, LLC,  
 
                                                     
 60. Id. at 139 (this standard was originally set forth in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 
703 (Del. 1983)). 
 61. Id. at 136. 
 62. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(a). 
 63. Id. § 56a-404(b)(1)(3). 
 64. Welch, 133 P.3d at 141. 
 65. Id. 
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competed with or held any interest adverse to MR Imaging Center, L.P., 
prior to the merger.66 
The court agreed with Via Christi, concluding: 
[N]o question exists that the interests of the plaintiff limited partners 
were adverse to both Via Christi and the new investors of MRI, LLC.  
However, [Via Christi] rightly point[s] out that the question is whether 
Via Christi acted as or on behalf of a party with an adverse interest to 
the partnership under this statutory provision.67 
Additionally, the court held that the simple fact that MRI, LLC was 
merging with the limited partnership does not per se establish that its 
interests were adverse in the absence of any evidence of adversity.68  As 
a result, the court concluded the plaintiffs had not established a prima 
facie breach of fiduciary duty under section 56a-404.69 
Via Christi also contended that the plaintiffs . . . made no specific 
allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct so 
as to invoke a judicial inquiry into the fairness of the transaction.70  The 
court sided with Via Christi and rejected the plaintiffs contention that 
Via Christis influence over Paragons evaluation resulted in fraud, 
noting that while the evidence established Via Christi may have 
influenced the appraisal process . . . it is clear that this influence 
[resulted] in an increase of $3.2 million in the valuation of the limited 
partnership, which was in the best interest of the limited partners as well 
as the general partner.71  The court also focused on the stipulation of the 
parties that Paragon would testify it had performed an independent 
valuation.72  As a consequence, the court determined the plaintiffs had 
not established fraud, misrepresentation, or similar misconduct sufficient 
to shift the burden of proof to Via Christi.73  Having determined that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie breach of fiduciary duty under 
section 56a-404, or specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or similar 
misconduct, the court concluded that Via Christi had not breached its 
fiduciary duty as a result of the squeeze-out merger.74 
                                                     
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 142. 
 68. Id. at 143. 
 69. Id. at 145. 
 70. Id. at 144. 
 71. Id. at 145. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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III. THE MERGER BETWEEN MR IMAGING CENTER, L.P. AND MRI, LLC 
DID NOT CREATE APPRAISAL RIGHTS 
The Kansas Supreme Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff 
limited partners in Welch were not entitled to appraisal rights.  An 
appraisal proceeding is typically a statutory remedy; a party dissenting to 
a merger is not entitled to appraisal rights under the common law.75  As a 
consequence, the plaintiffs had to locate an applicable statute granting 
appraisal rights. 
A. No Appraisal Rights Exist in the Mixed Entity Merger Statutes 
Both parties asserted that the authority to merge a limited partnership 
and a limited liability company derives from the Mixed Entity Merger 
statutes, sections 17-7701 to 17-7708 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated.76  
Section 17-7703 provides any . . . domestic limited partnerships may 
merge . . . with any one or more persons at least one of which is not a 
limited partnership, and any . . . domestic limited liability companies 
may merge . . . with any one or more persons at least one of which is not 
a limited liability company.77  No provision in the Mixed Entity Merger 
statutes grants appraisal rights to parties dissenting from a merger to 
which its provisions apply.78  Section 17-7707(k), however, states 
                                                     
 75. Wichers v. Solomon Valley Feed Lot, Inc., 704 P.2d 383, 385 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985).  See 
also Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 861 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Del. 2004) (The 
Court of Chancery properly held that a statutory appraisal remedy is a narrow statutory right that is 
available only to stockholders. (emphasis added)); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 
296 (Del. 1996) (An appraisal proceeding is a limited statutory remedy. (citing Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc. 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988) (emphasis added)); 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations 
§ 2207 (2004) (An appraisal proceeding is a statutory remedy that provides equitable relief to 
shareholders who dissent from a merger on the ground of the inadequacy of the offering price. 
(emphasis added)).  Appraisal rights can also be created contractually by two parties.  See, e.g., KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 17-7682 (Supp. 2006) (pertaining to LLC mergers). 
 76. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7701(d) ([A]ny merger or consolidation between . . . one or 
more domestic limited partnerships and any one or more constituent entities at least one of which is 
not a limited partnership, or one or more domestic limited liability companies and any one or more 
constituent entities at least one of which is not a limited liability company shall be governed by and 
subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 17-7701 through 17-7708, and amendments thereto. (emphasis 
added)); Welch, 133 P.3d at 129 (The plaintiffs and the defendants seem to agree that the merger 
between MR Imaging Center, L.P., and MRI, LLC, is governed by [the Mixed Entity Merger 
statutes].). 
 77. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7703. 
 78. See id. § 17-7701 to 7708 (lacking a statutory appraisal right provision); Brief of Appellees, 
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[n]othing in K.S.A. 17-7701 through 17-7708 shall abridge or impair 
any dissenters appraisal shares or their equivalent rights that may 
otherwise be available to the members or shareholders or other holders of 
an interest, in any constituent entity.79 
Via Christi contended that the doctrine of independent legal 
significance prevented the plaintiffs from inferring statutory appraisal 
rights outside of the Mixed Entity Merger statutes.80  The thrust of this 
argument is that the legislature provided statutory appraisal rights in 
some types of mergers (such as between two partnerships), but did not 
provide appraisal rights under the Mixed Entity Merger statutes.81  This 
argument ignored the express language of section 17-7707(k) entirely.  
Because the merger was performed under the Mixed Entity Merger 
statutes, the entire statutory framework was relevant and had legal 
significance.  The plaintiffs stressed this point in their reply brief to the 
court, contending that the doctrine of independent legal significance 
stands only for the proposition that the mere fact that a transaction 
cannot be accomplished under one statutory provision does not invalidate 
it if a different statutory method of consummation exists.82  The court 
correctly agreed with the plaintiffs and properly noted that Via Christi 
indirectly acknowledged this fact when it stated the doctrine does not 
preclude looking beyond [The Mixed Entity Merger statutes] . . . [to] 
rights that might exist in the operating or merger agreement of a limited 
liability company under K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 17-7682.83  Thus, the 
merger did not create appraisal rights under the Mixed Entity Merger 
statutes, but section 17-7707(k) preserved any rights available in 
KRULPA or KUPA. 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 22, at 14 (acknowledging that the legislature did not create new dissenters or appraisal 
rights in the Mixed Entity Merger statutes). 
 79. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7707(k). 
 80. Welch, 133 P.3d at 129.  See also Brief of Appellees, supra note 22, at 7 (Just because one 
may find appraisal rights in one merger statute does not mean those appraisal rights attach to a 
merger under a different statute.). 
 81. Welch, 133 P.3d at 129.  As the court noted in its opinion, Via Christi contend[s] it is the 
prerogative of the legislature to provide appraisal rights for one form of merger but not for another, 
and each entity merger must comply with the strictures of the authorizing statute and is limited to the 
remedies found in the authorizing statute.  Id. 
 82. See Reply Br. of Appellants at 2, Welch, 133 P.3d 122 (No. 04-92867-A) (quoting In re 
Pure Res., Inc., Sholders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 434 (Del. Ch. 2002)). 
 83. Welch, 133 P.3d at 130. 
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B. The Merger Did Not Create Appraisal Rights Under the Kansas 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
KRULPA provides that limited partnerships formed on or after 
January 1, 1984 are governed by its provisions.84  Its provisions do not 
provide appraisal rights.  As a consequence, the plaintiffs attempted to 
get out of KRULPA and employ a provision in KUPA allowing appraisal 
rights for dissociated partners.  Section 56-1a604 of KRULPA provides 
that [i]n any case not provided for in the Kansas revised limited 
partnership act, the provisions of the Kansas uniform partnership act . . . 
shall govern.85 
Via Christi tried to prevent the plaintiffs from using section 56a-601 
to get out of KRULPA by contending that the merger caused the limited 
partners to be dissociated resulting from withdrawal, which is covered in 
section 56-1a353(b) of KRULPA.86  The court correctly noted this 
argument [was] without merit because the plaintiffs were not claiming 
to have withdrawn by the only type of withdrawal permitted by section 
56-1a353(b): at the time or upon the happening of events specified in 
writing in the partnership agreement.87  Rather, the plaintiffs asserted 
that the merger caused them to be involuntarily dissociated from the 
partnership.  Therefore, the court appropriately shifted its analysis to the 
provisions of KUPA. 
                                                     
 84. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a603(a) (All domestic limited partnerships formed on or after 
January 1, 1984, shall be governed by the provisions of the Kansas revised uniform limited 
partnership act.). 
 85. Id. § 56-1a604; see also Temple v. White Lakes Plaza Assocs., 816 P.2d 399, 405 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1991) (RULPA itself provides that for cases not covered by its provisions, the Kansas 
Uniform Partnership Act . . . should be applied.). 
 86. Welch, 133 P.3d at 131. 
 87. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a353(b).  The definition of withdraw is to remove oneself 
from some activity.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2183 (2d ed. 1993); see also 
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1632 (8th ed. 2004) (defining withdraw as to leave or retire).  
Further, the definition of dissociate includes to sever the association of (oneself); separate . . . to 
withdraw from association.  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 570 (2d ed. 1993) 
(emphasis added).  Additionally, in KUPA, section 56a-601(a) lists as the first example of a way a 
partner is dissociated as [a] partnerships having notice of the partners express will to withdraw as 
a partner or on a later date specified by the partner.  Arguably, if withdrawal is covered in section 
56-1a353(b) of KRULPA, and the definition of dissociation includes withdrawal from 
association, and is listed as a type of dissociation in section 56a-601, one type of dissociation is 
provided for in KRULPA and section 56-1a604 cannot be used for any type of dissociation.  This 
argument fails to note that the type of withdrawal allowed by the KRULPA provision is narrowly 
limited to at the time or upon the happening of events specified in writing in the partnership 
agreement.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a353(b).  The plaintiffs did not claim to have withdrawn upon 
an event stated in the partnership agreement.  Rather, the plaintiffs claimed they were dissociated 
involuntarily by merger with a limited liability company, for which KRULPA does not provide. 
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C. The Merger Did Not Create Appraisal Rights Under the Kansas 
Uniform Partnership Act 
Section 56a-701(i) of KUPA provides statutory appraisal rights for a 
dissociated partner, and section 56a-601 provides a list of events that 
cause a partners dissociation.88  Specifically, section 56a-601(c) 
provides a partner is dissociated from a partnership upon the partners 
expulsion pursuant to the partnership agreement.89  To fit into section 
56a-601(c), the plaintiffs attempted to use the terms squeeze-out 
merger and expel synonymously, arguing that the limited partnership 
agreement was amended by Via Christi for the specific purpose of 
squeezing out or expelling the plaintiffs.90 
This argument was flawed because squeeze-out merger and 
expel cannot be used interchangeably.  KUPA does not define the term 
expulsion, but courts and scholars have determined the concept implies 
that the entity continues to exist after the event.91  MR Imaging Center 
did not continue to exist after the merger.  Further, Via Christi correctly 
noted that if expelling a partner is equivalent to squeeze out through a 
merger, then it would seem logical for Section 56a-601(c) to cross-
reference Section 56a-901 [Conversion and Merger] definitions.92  
Thus, the plaintiffs were not expelled under section 56a-601(c) as a result 
of the merger. 
The plaintiffs alternatively contended that they could employ section 
56a-701(i) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated because the merger caused 
them to be dissociated under another provision in KUPA, section 56a-
906(e).93  Article 9 of KUPA is titled Conversions and Mergers.  
Section 56a-906(e), located in Article 9, provides, [a] partner of a party 
to a merger who does not become a partner of the surviving partnership 
or limited partnership is dissociated from the entity, of which that partner 
                                                     
 88. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-701(i) (A dissociated partner may maintain an action against 
the partnership . . . to determine the buyout price of that partners interest . . . .); Id. § 56a-601. 
 89. Id. § 56a-601(c). 
 90. Welch, 133 P.3d at 13233. 
 91. See, e.g., Bernard J. Davies, Jr., The Good Faith Principle and the Expulsion Clause in 
Partnership Law, 33 CONVEYANCE & PROP. LAW. 32, 4041 (1969) (stating that the entity must 
continue to exist); see also Poeta v. Jaffe, No. 1357, 2001 WL 1773885, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 2, 
2001) (discussing that expulsion from a firm implies that the firm continues).  Blacks Law 
Dictionary defines the word expel to mean [t]o drive out or away; to eject, [especially] with force, 
which implies the object the person is expelled from must continue to exist.  BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY 617 (8th ed. 2004). 
 92. Brief of Appellees, supra note 22, at 1617. 
 93. Welch, 133 P.3d at 133. 
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was a partner, as of the date the merger takes effect.94  The thrust of the 
plaintiffs argument was that section 56a-906(e) creates a separate basis 
for dissociation, and if a partner is dissociated under this provision, 
section 56a-701(i)s granting of appraisal rights for dissociated partners 
can be utilized.95 
The plaintiffs argument was technically inapplicable because the 
limited partners were not a party to a merger who does not become a 
partner of the surviving partnership or limited partnership.96  The entity 
surviving the merger was a limited liability company, not a partnership 
or limited partnership.  Moreover, section 56a-906 is immediately 
preceded by section 56a-905, which authorizes mergers only between a 
partnership and one or more partnerships or limited partnerships.97  
Likewise, sections 56a-901, 56a-902, and 56a-903 in Article 9 only 
pertain to partnerships or limited partnerships.98  Thus, the placement of 
section 56a-906(e) in Article 9 along with the language surviving 
partnership or limited partnership leads to the conclusion that the 
section does not apply to a merger between a limited partnership and a 
limited liability company when the entity that survives the merger is a 
limited liability company.99 
Via Christi argued that section 56a-906(e) does not provide a 
separate basis for dissociation because section 56a-601 lists the only 
ways a partner can become dissociated under KUPA.100  Via Christi 
bolstered this argument with language located in an official comment of 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).101  Official Comment 1 
to RUPA section 601, section 56a-906(e)s counterpart, states, Section 
601 enumerates all of the events that cause a partners dissociation.102 
Via Christis argument failed to consider the importance of the 
express language in section 56a-906(e) mandating the use of section 56a-
701.  Section 56a-906(e) states that [t]he surviving entity shall cause the 
                                                     
 94. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-906(e). 
 95. Welch, 133 P.3d at 133. 
 96. Id. (citing § 56a-906(e)) (emphasis added). 
 97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-905. 
 98. See id. §§ 56a-901 to 903 (referring only to partnerships and limited partnerships). 
 99. See Welch, 133 P.3d at 135 (As the plaintiffs did not and could not argue that the merger 
in this case occurred under the authority of K.S.A. 56a-905, which deals exclusively with the merger 
of partnerships, it cannot take advantage of the effect of merger statute, K.S.A. 56a-906(e).); see 
also id. at 135 (An appellate court must consider all of the provisions of a statute in pari materia 
rather than in isolation, and these provisions must be reconciled, if possible, to make them consistent 
and harmonious. (citing State v. Legero, 91 P.3d 1216 (Kan. 2004))). 
 100. Id. at 134. 
 101. Id. 
 102. REVISED UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 601 cmt. 1 (2006). 
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partners interest in the entity to be purchased under K.S.A. 56a-701.103  
The title of section 56a-701 is [p]urchase of dissociated partners 
interest, and every subsection pertaining to the purchase of a partners 
interest uses the terminology dissociated partner, in one form or 
another.104  If section 56a-906(e) does not create a separate basis for 
dissociation, a partner to whom section 56a-906(e) applies could not 
utilize any of section 56a-701 because he or she would not be dissociated 
as the subsections require.  This would make the phrase the surviving 
entity shall cause the partners interest in the entity to be purchased under 
section 56a-701 meaningless.  Alternatively, concluding that a partner 
to whom section 56a-906(e) applies can utilize only the subsections of 
section 56a-701 pertaining to the buyout of the partners interest but not 
employ subsection (i) appraisal rights in the same section would create 
an absurd result: a partner would be dissociated for some purposes of the 
section but not for others.  Moreover, as the court noted in its analysis, 
Kansas has not adopted Official Comment 1 to RUPA 601.105  
Furthermore, section 56a-601 does not contain language indicating the 
list of dissociation events is an exclusive list.106  Most importantly, 
section 56a-906(e) actually states that the partner is dissociated.  Thus, 
the conclusion must be reached that section 56a-906(e) creates a separate 
basis for dissociation but that it could not be utilized by the plaintiffs 
because the surviving entity was neither a partnership nor a limited 
partnership. 
In summary, the plaintiffs needed to locate an applicable statute 
granting appraisal rights.  The Mixed Entity Merger statutes, KRULPA, 
and KUPA do not provide appraisal rights for a partner squeezed out in a 
merger between a limited partnership and a limited liability company.  
As a result, the court properly concluded that the plaintiffs could not 
utilize appraisal rights to guarantee a judicially determined fair price. 
IV. VIA CHRISTI ENGAGED IN SELF-DEALING AND MUST DEMONSTRATE 
A FAIR MERGER PRICE TO AVOID BREACHING ITS FIDUCIARY DUTY 
In addition to appraisal rights, the plaintiffs attempted to obtain a 
judicially-determined fair price through damages incurred from Via 
                                                     
 103. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-906(e) (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. § 56a-701 (emphasis added). 
 105. See Welch, 133 P.3d at 134 (Kansas has not specifically adopted the Official Comment to 
§ 601.). 
 106. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-601 (stating [a] partner is dissociated from a partnership upon 
the occurrence of any of the following events). 
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Christis breach of fiduciary duty.  In addressing this issue, the Kansas 
Supreme Court faced the challenging task of construing statutory 
provisions codifying a general partners fiduciary duty, interpreting 
corporate fiduciary principles, and applying those principles to the 
merger between MR Imaging Center and MRI, LLC.  Unfortunately, the 
court reached three erroneous conclusions regarding Via Christis 
fiduciary duties under section 56a-404 of KUPA.  First, the court 
believed Via Christi only owed a duty of loyalty in section 56a-404(b) to 
the partnership.107  A correct reading of this provision, however, reveals 
that Via Christi owed a duty of loyalty to both the partnership and other 
partners.  Second, the court determined Via Christis orchestration of a 
squeeze-out merger did not violate section 56a-404(b)(2)s prohibition 
against acting as or on behalf of a party having an adverse interest to the 
partnership.108  This flawed construction resulted from the courts failure 
to realize that MRI, LLC clearly had an adverse interest to MR Imaging 
Center.  Finally, the court believed section 56a-404(e) allows a partner to 
self-deal without breaching any fiduciary duty.109  This blunder stemmed 
from the failure to recognize the distinction between self-dealing and 
self-interest. 
Regarding the interpretation of corporate fiduciary principles, the 
Kansas Supreme Court misapplied the Weinberger standard by requiring 
the plaintiffs to demonstrate fraud, misrepresentation, or similar 
misconduct.  Weinberger requires this heightened burden of proof only 
when the plaintiff is already ensured a judicially determined fair price 
through appraisal rights. 
In a correct fiduciary duty analysis, the heightened burden under 
Weinberger was inapplicable to the merger in Welch because the 
plaintiffs could not utilize appraisal rights.  As a result, Via Christi had 
the burden of demonstrating a fair merger price to avoid breaching its 
fiduciary duty because it engaged in self-dealing, an action prohibited by 
section 404(b)(2).  Thus, the squeezed-out limited partners should have 
obtained a judicially determined fair merger price in their breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. 
                                                     
 107. Welch, 133 P.3d at 140. 
 108. Id. at 142. 
 109. Id. at 138. 
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A. Section 56a-404 of KUPA Set Forth Via Christis Fiduciary Duties 
Before delving into the substance of this discussion, it is important to 
remember the statutory limits of a general partners fiduciary duty.  As 
discussed in Part III.B, a limited partnership is governed by the 
provisions of KRULPA, and, where KRULPA is silent, the provisions of 
KUPA govern by virtue of section 56-1a604 of the Kansas Statutes 
Annotated.  Section 56-1a353(c) of KRULPA provides that a general 
partner in a limited partnership has the same liabilities to the partnership 
and other partners as a general partner in a general partnership.110  
KRULPA, however, fails to specifically address the fiduciary duties of a 
general partner.  As a consequence, sections 56-1a604 and 56-1a253 
incorporate the fiduciary duties of a general partner in KUPA. 
A general partners fiduciary duties are codified in section 56a-404 
of KUPA.  With regard to a general partners duty of loyalty, section 
56a-404(b) provides: 
A partners duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is 
limited to the following: (1) To account to the partnership and hold as 
trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in 
the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived from 
a use by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation 
of a partnership opportunity; (2) to refrain from dealing with the 
partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business as 
or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership; and 
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the 
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership.111 
Further, section 56a-404(e) states that [a] partner does not violate a 
duty or obligation under this act or under the partnership agreement 
merely because the partners conduct furthers the partners own 
interest.112 
                                                     
 110. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a353(c). 
 111. Id. § 56a-404(b). 
 112. Id. § 56a-404(e). 
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1. The Duty of Loyalty in Section 56a-404(b) Is Owed to Both the 
Partnership and the Other Partners 
The Kansas Supreme Court determined that a general partner only 
owes a duty of loyalty to the partnership by virtue of section 56a-
404(b).113  This conclusion stemmed from the exclusiveness of the 
language in section 56a-404(b)[a] partners duty of loyalty to the 
partnership and the other partners is limited to the followingcoupled 
with the fact that subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3) only mention the 
partnership.114 
The courts statutory construction, however, confuses to whom the 
duty is owed and what the duty actually is.  Subsections (b)(1), (2), and 
(3) of section 56a-404 detail what a general partners duty of loyalty is.  
These subsections do not specify to whom the duty of loyalty is owed.  
The pertinent phrases specifying to whom the duty of loyalty is owed are 
found in the first sentences of both subsection 56a-404(a) and (b), the 
former stating [t]he only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the 
partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
care, and the latter providing [a] partners duty of loyalty to the 
partnership and the other partners is limited to the following.115  
Moreover, the phrase is limited to the following is limiting what 
subsequently follows, subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3), not the preceding 
portion of the sentence stating to whom the duty of loyalty is owed. 
Similar phraseology in section 56a-404(c), which codifies a general 
partners duty of care, bolsters this conclusion.  Section 56a-404(c) 
provides: [a] partners duty of care to the partnership and the other 
partners in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business is 
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless 
conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.116  The 
duty of care is owed to both partners and the partnership, while 
refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law is what the duty is 
actually limited to.  Therefore, a careful reading of subsections 56a-
                                                     
 113. Welch, 133 P.3d at 142. 
 114. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(b)(emphasis added); Welch, 133 P.3d at 140. 
 115. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(a), (b) (emphasis added).  Although the duties in (b)(1), (2), 
and (3) discuss interactions only with the partnership, these duties are owed to both the other 
partners and the partnership by virtue of the first sentence in section 56a-404(b).  If the RUPA 
drafters intended that the duty of loyalty only apply to the partnership, the words a duty to the 
partnership to could have been added at the beginning of (b)(1), (2), and (3). 
 116. Id. § 56a-404(c) (emphasis added). 
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404(a) and (b), coupled with similar language in subsection (c) reveals 
that a general partners duty of loyalty in subsection (b) is owed to both 
the partnership and other partners. 
2. Orchestrating a Squeeze-Out Merger and Engaging in Self-Dealing 
Are Both Prohibited by Section 56a-404(b)(2) 
The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that a general partners 
orchestration of a squeeze-out merger does not create a prima facie 
breach of fiduciary duty under section 56a-404(b)(2) of the Kansas 
Statutes Annotated.117  This section encompasses the prohibition against 
dealing with the partnership . . . as or on behalf of a party having an 
interest adverse to the partnership in the duty of loyalty.118  The court 
believed the simple fact that MRI, LLC was merging with the limited 
partnership does not per se establish that its interests were adverse in the 
absence of any evidence of adversity.119  The court restricted its 
definition of adverseness to categories such as competition or 
appropriating business.120 
The interests of MRI, LLC, however, were completely adverse to the 
interests of MR Imaging Center.  MR Imaging Centers interests in the 
merger can only be described as a bargain for the highest and best 
available price for the partnership and the other partners, while MRI, 
LLCs interests in the merger can only be described as a bargain for the 
lowest price possible.  These two interests are clearly adverse to each 
other.  Further, courts have repeatedly determined that parties on 
opposite sides of a merger are adverse to each other.121  It is simple fact 
that a general partner who orchestrates a squeeze-out merger does create 
                                                     
 117. Welch, 133 P.3d at 143. 
 118. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(b)(2). 
 119. Welch, 133 P.3d at 143. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Carlyle Towers Condo. Assn v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D.N.J. 
1996) (stating conflict arose when law firms representation of plaintiff became adverse to interests 
of parent corporation of subsidiary that firm represented in transactional matter, due to merger of 
parent with defendant); Zirn v. VLI Corp., No. 9488, 1990 WL 119685, at *8 (Del. Ch. 1990) 
(Communications between VLI Corporation and American Home . . . prior to the execution of the 
original merger agreement . . . cannot be privileged . . . because the companies clearly had adverse 
interests . . . .), revd on other grounds, 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993); George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of 
Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 
607 (1988) (noting the [mergers and acquisitions] specialty firm inevitably faces frequent and 
recurring conflicts of interest between present and former clients with adverse or potentially adverse 
interests); Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the 
Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 175 (2003) (Accounting firms 
routinely represent clients with adverse interests, for example, both sides in a corporate merger.). 
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a prima facie breach of fiduciary duty under section 56a-404(b)(2), 
because the parties to the transaction have adverse interests. 
Additionally, a prima facie breach of fiduciary duty under section 
56a-404(b)(2) will always occur if a general partner engages in self-
dealing.  Official Comment 2 to RUPA section 404, a section the Kansas 
Legislature adopted verbatim in section 56a-404(b)(2), states that its 
provisions [are] derived from Sections 389 and 391 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency.122  Section 389 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency provides that an agent is subject to a duty not to deal with his 
principal as an adverse party in a transaction connected with his agency 
without the principals knowledge.123  The comment to section 389 
further notes that the rule in section 389 is applicable to transactions in 
which the agent self-deals.124  If section 389 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency is applicable to self-dealing transactions, and RUPA section 
404(b)(2) is derived from and contains similar language to section 389, 
then any self-dealing by a partner establishes a prima facie breach of 
section 56a-404(b)(2).  This conclusion is bolstered by another comment 
to RUPA section 404.  Comment 2 states: 
[C]omment c to section 389 explains that the rule [in 404(b)(2)] is not 
based upon the harm caused to the principal, but upon avoiding a 
conflict of opposing interests in the mind of an agent whose duty is to 
act for the benefit of his principal.  The most obvious example of when 
a conflict of opposing interests arises is when self-dealing is present 
because the partner is acting for both the partnership and him or 
herself.125 
The Kansas Supreme Court paraphrases this comment at page 142 of 
the opinion, but obviously fails to understand its meaning.  Immediately 
preceding the paraphrase the court states no evidence was presented that 
Via Christi itself possessed adverse interests to the limited partnership, 
nor was there evidence that its presence on both sides of the transaction 
actually harmed the limited partnership in any way.126  The court should 
                                                     
 122. REVISED UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 2 (2006). 
 123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389 (1957) (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at cmt. a. (This section applies to transactions which the agent conducts for his 
principal, dealing therein with himself, and also to transactions in which the agent deals with his 
principal, who acts in person or through another agent; it is applicable to transactions in which the 
agent is acting entirely for himself and to those in which he has such a substantial interest that it 
reasonably might affect his judgment.); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1957) 
(Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal not to act on behalf of an 
adverse party in a transaction connected with his agency without the principals knowledge.). 
 125. REVISED UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). 
 126. Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., 133 P.3d 122, 142 (Kan. 2006). 
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have concluded that the harm caused to the limited partnership was 
irrelevant, and that a prima facie breach of fiduciary duty under section 
56a-404(b)(2) always occurs if a general partner engages in self-dealing. 
3. Section 56a-404(e) Allows Conduct Furthering a Partners Own 
Interest but Does Not Trump K.S.A. 56a-404(b)(2)s Prohibition of 
Self-Dealing 
Before discussing the breadth of section 56a-404(e), the distinction 
between self-interest and self-dealing must be established.  An individual 
acts in his own self-interest when engaging in a course of conduct from 
which he derives some personal benefit.  By contrast, self-dealing occurs 
when an individual, by virtue of his dominion over an entity, causes the 
entity to act in such a way that the individual inures some personal 
benefit from the entity to the exclusion of others in the entity.  The 
flagship case discussing this distinction is Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien127 
(Sinclair), a case in which the Delaware Supreme Court contrasted 
self-dealing and self-interest using two dividend transactions.  The first 
dividend transaction, the one at issue in the case, involved a controlling 
shareholder strapped for cash who caused a subsidiary corporation to 
declare a large cash dividend to all the shareholders.  The second 
dividend transaction, a hypothetical transaction posed by the court, 
involved a controlling shareholder compelling a corporation to declare a 
dividend only on class A shares of stock owned by the controlling 
shareholder, while other shareholders who owned class B stock received 
no dividends.  With regard to both transactions, self-interest existed 
because the controlling shareholder was compelling the corporation to 
declare a large cash dividend to further his own personal interests.  Self-
dealing, however, is present only in the second transaction.  In the first 
transaction, no self-dealing exists because the controlling shareholder 
does not receive something to the exclusion of the other shareholders; 
i.e., the minority shareholders receive a proportionate share of the cash 
dividend.128  In the second transaction, however, self-dealing is present 
because the controlling shareholder receives a large cash dividend to the 
exclusion of the shareholders who do not own class A stock.129  These 
two dividend transactions reveal that all self-dealing transactions involve 
some aspect of self-interest, but not all self-interested transactions 
involve self-dealing.  In other words, the two terms are not synonymous. 
                                                     
 127. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
 128. Id. at 72122. 
 129. Id. at 721. 
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With the distinction between self-interest and self-dealing in mind, 
section 56a-404(e) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated can be examined.  
Section 56a-404(e) provides that [a] partner does not violate a duty or 
obligation under this act or under the partnership agreement merely 
because the partners conduct furthers the partners own interest.130  The 
Kansas Supreme Court in Welch interpreted this provision broadly to 
include not only self-interested transactions, but also self-dealing 
transactions.  The court stated, while self-dealing is clearly present in 
this case, it is important to recognize the distinction under the KUPA 
statute providing that pursuing ones own self-interest is not per se a 
breach of a fiduciary duty.131  By adopting this rationale, the Kansas 
Supreme Court must have concluded either that self-interest and self-
dealing are synonymous terms or that because a self-dealing transaction 
involves self-interest and section 56a-404(e) allows the pursuit of self-
interest, section 56a-404(e) also must allow a partner to engage in self-
dealing. 
Other courts that have addressed whether RUPA section 404(e) 
(adopted verbatim in section 56a-404(e) of the Kansas Statutes 
Annotated) encompasses both self-dealing and self-interest have 
concluded that RUPA section 404(e) does not authorize a partner to 
engage in self-dealing.132  For example, in Enea v. Superior Court133 the 
California Court of Appeals decided an action brought by a partner in a 
partnership that owned office rental property.  The action alleged that 
two partners who occupied an office building owned by the partnership 
were paying rent to the partnership below the fair market rent.134  The 
two partners, while acknowledging the presence of self-dealing, 
contended that RUPA section 404(e) nonetheless permitted the rental of 
partnership property to partners below market rates.135  Adamantly 
rejecting this contention, the California Court of Appeals declared, 
[RUPA 404(e)] did not empower [the self-dealing partners] to occupy 
partnership property for their own exclusive benefit at partnership 
expense . . . .136  Rather, the purpose of this provision is to excuse a 
partner from engaging in a transaction which merely further[s] [the 
                                                     
 130. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(e) (2005). 
 131. Welch, 133 P.3d at 138. 
 132. Two recent cases discussing this issue are Enea v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 
(2005) and In re Textainer Pship Sec. Litig., No. C-05-0969, 2005 WL 3801596 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 
2005). 
 133. Enea, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513. 
 134. Id. at 515. 
 135. Id. at 518. 
 136. Id. (emphasis added). 
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partners] own interests but does not deprive the partnership of valuable 
assets.137  In other words, RUPA section 404(e) does not authorize a 
partner to engage in self-dealing. 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Welch incorrectly concluded that 
section 56a-404(e) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated allows both self-
interest and self-dealing.138  This section only states that a partner does 
not violate a duty under KUPA merely because the partners conduct 
furthers the partners own interest.139  An example is provided in 
Comment 5 of RUPA section 404(e): A partner who, with consent, 
owns a shopping center may, under subsection (e), legitimately vote 
against a proposal by the partnership to open a competing shopping 
center.140  In this example, the partner is not self-dealing because he or 
she is not causing the partnership to act in such a way that the partner 
receives some personal benefit to the exclusion of the other partners in 
the partnership.  Rather, the partner is merely acting in his or her own 
self-interest, voting against a proposal that could potentially have a 
detrimental effect on the shopping center he currently owns.141  The 
drafters of RUPA undoubtedly created RUPA section 404(e) to ensure 
that partners are not held to the standard of a true trustee and to negate 
the abundance of case law holding a partner in a partnership to a higher 
duty than a director of a corporation.  No evidence exists, however, that 
the RUPA drafters envisioned that RUPA section 404(e) authorizes a 
partner to engage in self-dealing to the detriment of other partners and 
the partnership.142 
Further, as a cardinal rule of statutory construction, statutory 
provisions should be construed to complement rather than conflict with 
each other.  Section 56a-404(b)(2) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated 
forbids self-dealing by requiring a partner to refrain from dealing with 
the partnership as a party having an adverse interest to the partnership.  If 
section 56a-404(e) is broadened to authorize self-dealing, these two 
provisions would conflict.  The proper constructionthat section 56a-
404 prohibits self-dealingavoids conflicting provisions and limits 
section 56a-404(e) to what it expressly states: a partner does not commit 
                                                     
 137. Id. 
 138. Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., 133 P.3d 122 (Kan. 2006). 
 139. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(e) (2005). 
 140. REVISED UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404(e) cmt. 5 (2006). 
 141. No problem exists under section 56a-404(b)(3) with owning the other shopping center 
because the other partners consented, as is their privilege under section 56a-103(b)(3)(ii). 
 142. The Kansas Supreme Court believed pursuing self-interest was not a per se breach.  Welch, 
133 P.3d at 138.  While a fair reading of section 56a-404(e), this does not mean that self-dealing is 
not a prima facie breach. 
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a breach of fiduciary duty merely by pursuing his or her own self-
interest. 
By extending the breadth of section 56a-404(e) to include self-
dealing transactions, the Kansas Supreme Courts decision has the 
practical effect of repealing the traditional notion of the duty of loyalty.  
Traditionally, the duty of loyalty requires that a party demonstrate [his 
or her] utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the 
bargain when engaging in a self-dealing transaction.143  This strict 
fairness test protects minority interest holders from the controlling party 
who has the ability to unilaterally implement transactions to the 
detriment of minority [interest holders].144  But following the Kansas 
Supreme Courts decision in Welch, demonstrating a partner engaged in 
self-dealing alone will not invoke the strict fairness test.  Rather, the 
party defending the transaction will still be afforded the protections of 
the more lenient business judgment rule despite the fact that self-
dealing is present.  As a result, the Kansas Supreme Courts decision has 
the practical effect of annulling a partners duty of loyalty. 
B. Corporate Fiduciary Duty Principles 
Under corporate law, the term fiduciary duty encompasses both the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.145  To determine whether a decision 
has caused a breach of either duty, courts use a standard of review called 
the business judgment rule.  The business judgment rule is an evidentiary 
presumption created to protect decisions that are on an informed basis, 
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.146  The rule is designed to protect decision-
makers, and courts generally will not second guess judgments subject to 
the business judgment rule.147  When a decision is challenged, the initial 
                                                     
 143. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)). 
 144. Richard T. Hossfeld, Short-Form Mergers After Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp.: 
Time to Reform Appraisal, 53 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1343 (2004) (citing Bradley R. Aronstam et al., 
Delawares Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake 
of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 BUS. LAW. 519, 520 (2003)).  A discussion of how the strict 
fairness test protects minority interest holders appears later in this Comment. 
 145. See, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, What Remedies Should Be Made Available to the Dissatisfied 
Participant in a Limited Liability Company?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 494 (1994) (discussing the 
corporate standards of conduct). 
 146. Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
812 (Del. 1984)), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 147. See Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960) ([W]e find ourselves in the twilight 
zone where reasonable businessmen, fully informed, might differ.  We think, therefore, we are 
precluded from substituting our uninformed opinion for that of experienced business managers of a 
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burden is placed upon the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of the 
business judgment rule by showing that in fact the decision-maker did 
not make the challenged decision on an informed basis, in good faith, 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of 
the company.148  One way to accomplish this task is to prove the 
existence of self-dealing.149 
Rebutting the presumption of the business judgment ruleby, for 
example, proving the existence of self-dealingdoes not automatically 
invalidate a transaction.150  Rather, the burden shifts to the decision-
maker.  With the burden shifted, the decision-maker can travel down one 
of two avenues.  First, the decision-maker can demonstrate [his or her] 
utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the 
bargain.151  Second, the decision-maker can show that a majority of 
disinterested directors approved the transaction.152 
                                                                                                                       
corporation . . . .). 
 148. Constance Frisby Fain, Corporate Director and Officer Liability, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L.J. 417, 422 (1996) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). 
 149. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating that directors wishing to use the protections of the 
business judgment rule can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any 
personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves 
upon the corporation or all stockholders generally); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 
(Del. 1971) (holding that a parent corporation self-dealing through its subsidiary cannot use 
protections of the business judgment rule); see also Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a 
New Interpretation of the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 
58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 614 (1995) (Consequently, the plaintiff must rebut this presumption, one way 
of which is to show a breach of the directors duty of loyalty.). 
 150. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (Burden shifting 
does not create per se liability on the part of the directors.); Liston v. Gottesegen, 348 F.3d 294, 
303 (1st Cir. 2003) ([A] corporate fiduciary is not entirely barred from . . . entering into a self-
dealing transaction.); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2006) (stating that [n]o contract or 
transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation 
and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its 
directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable 
solely for this reason (emphasis added)). 
 151. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 
457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)).  The entire fairness test protects minority shareholder directors who 
have the ability to unilaterally implement transactions to the detriment of minority shareholders.  
Hossfeld, supra note 144, at 1343. 
 152. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006) (Section 144 of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law provides a safe harbor for interested transactions, like this 
one, if [t]he material facts as to the directors . . . relationship or interest and as to the contract or 
transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors . . . and the board . . . in good faith 
authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested 
directors . . . .  After approval by disinterested directors, courts review the interested transaction 
under the business judgment rule,  which is a presumption that in making a business decision, the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interest of the company. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) 
(2006); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted)). 
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In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,153 the Supreme Court of Delaware 
analyzed a squeeze-out merger orchestrated by a controlling shareholder 
to eliminate minority shareholders.154  The court stated that generally, 
[t]he requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one 
stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its 
entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the 
courts.155  The court, however, deviated from the typical corporate 
fiduciary principles.  The court concluded that even if self-dealing can be 
established, a minority shareholder entitled to appraisal rights must show 
fraud, misrepresentation, or similar misconduct to establish that the 
majority shareholder breached its fiduciary duty.156  The rationale for this 
deviation becomes apparent upon the realization that the typical remedy 
afforded in both an appraisal proceeding and a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim is a judicially determined fair price for the cashed-out shares.  If a 
judicially determined fair price is already ensured by the availability of 
an appraisal proceeding, performing a fiduciary duty analysis which only 
yields the same remedy has no utility.   
The Weinberger court also recognized that a squeezed-out minority 
shareholder may desire an atypical equitable remedy, such as rescission, 
in a breach of fiduciary duty claim.  The court acknowledged that a 
judicially determined fair price might not always be an adequate remedy 
and an equitable remedy may be appropriate in some circumstances.157  
In order to be entitled to an equitable remedy, however, the court 
determined that the burden remained on the plaintiff to establish fraud, 
misrepresentation, or similar misconduct: [u]nder such circumstances, 
the Chancellors powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable 
and monetary relief as may be appropriate, including rescissory 
damages.158 
After reviewing Weinberger, the Kansas Supreme Court determined 
that the plaintiffs had the burden to show fraud, misrepresentation, or 
similar misconduct in the breach of fiduciary duty claim.159  This 
determination ignored the very rationale behind deviating from the 
                                                     
 153. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 154. Id. at 70406. 
 155. Id. at 710 (citation omitted). 
 156. Id. at 714.  The court also stated the minority shareholders remedy in a cash-out merger 
ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding.  Id. 
 157. The court noted that [t]he appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain 
cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, 
or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.  Id. at 714. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., 133 P.3d 122, 139 (Kan. 2006). 
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traditional controlling shareholder fiduciary duty analysis: a judicially 
determined fair price is already ensured by the availability of appraisal 
rights.  In this case, the Kansas Supreme Court correctly concluded the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to appraisal rights.  As a result, the Kansas 
Supreme Court should not have invoked the heightened burden in 
Weinberger.  The plaintiffs, who were not entitled to appraisal rights, 
were only seeking a judicially determined fair price, not equitable relief, 
for Via Christis breach of fiduciary duty.160 
C. Application of Corporate Fiduciary Principles to a General Partner 
Orchestrating a Squeeze-Out Merger 
Applying corporate merger fiduciary principles to the squeeze-out 
merger in Welch, the original burden of proof should have been placed 
on the plaintiff limited partners to establish that Via Christi engaged in 
self-dealing in orchestrating the squeeze-out merger.  The exclusive 
language in section 56a-404 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, limiting a 
general partners duties, does not impede the application of this principle.  
Self-dealing is prohibited, and the mere act of being on both sides of a 
merger is self-dealing and literally within the prohibition of section 56a-
404(b)(2).  If limited partners can establish self-dealing in a squeeze-out 
merger but are not entitled to appraisal rights, application of controlling 
shareholder principles mandates that the burden shift to the self-dealing 
general partner to establish that the limited partners received a fair value 
for their interests in the partnership.  Alternatively, the general partner 
can avoid breach of fiduciary duty by showing all the disinterested 
partners approved the transaction.161 
The apparent absolute prohibition on self-dealing in section 56a-404 
may seem at first glance to present an obstacle to allowing Via Christi to 
validate a self-dealing transaction by demonstrating a fair merger price.  
As previously mentioned, section 56a-404 codifies a partners fiduciary 
duty not to engage in certain conduct but does not address whether a 
partner who engages in prohibited conduct has the ability to validate the 
transaction and avoid a breach of fiduciary duty.  Allowing validation of 
                                                     
 160. The Kansas Supreme Court also overemphasized a stipulation by the parties regarding the 
appraiser Paragon.  The stipulation only stated that the parties agreed that if Paragon were to testify, 
Paragon would state that it had engaged in an independent valuation.  The stipulation did not provide 
that Paragon actually engaged in an independent valuation.  In fact, the plaintiffs had commissioned 
their own evaluation, which yielded a much larger cash price for the merger.  This second evaluation 
suggests Paragon might not have actually performed an independent valuation. 
 161. The default rule under section 56a-103(b)(3)(ii) is that the vote of all the disinterested 
partners must approve the transactions, unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise. 
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the transaction and the avoidance of a breach of fiduciary duty is in 
accord with Professor Edwin Heckers prediction of how courts should 
handle a breach of fiduciary duty claim under section 56a-404: 
[a]lthough stated as absolute prohibitions, these rules probably will be 
construed to merit validation of conduct that otherwise technically would 
violate the duty of loyalty if the partner carries the burden of proving 
good faith and the fairness of the challenged conduct.162  Moreover, the 
belief that the conduct in section 56a-404 is not absolutely prohibited is 
bolstered by contrasting RUPA section 404(b)(3) with the example in 
Comment 5 of RUPA section 404.  RUPA section 404(b)(3), like section 
56a-404(b)(3) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, states that a partners 
duty of loyalty includes the duty to refrain from competing with the 
partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before the 
dissolution of the partnership.  The example in Comment 5 of RUPA, 
however, states, [A] partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center 
may, under subsection (e), legitimately vote against a proposal by the 
partnership to open a competing shopping center.163  By allowing the 
partner with consent to compete with the partnership, an action 
prohibited in section 56a-404(b)(3), the RUPA drafters acknowledged 
that engaging in a prohibited activity under section 404 does not 
automatically establish a breach of loyalty.164 
Continuing the application of corporate fiduciary principles, if 
appraisal rights are not available to the plaintiffs, self-dealing alone shifts 
the burden and invokes the strict fairness test.  If appraisal rights are 
available to the plaintiffs, Weinberger instructs that a breach of fiduciary 
duty will only occur if fraud, misrepresentation, or similar misconduct is 
shown. 
My application of corporate fiduciary principles to mergers 
involving a partnership will further the goals of consistency and elevate 
substance over form.  If a merger occurs between two limited 
partnerships, or a general and a limited partnership, the cashed-out 
limited partners get a judicially-determined fair price under sections 56a-
906(e) and 56a-701.  If the general partner attempts to avoid these 
statutory appraisal rights by utilizing a limited liability company in the 
merger, my interpretation of section 56a-404 and corporate merger 
principles yields the same result: a judicially-determined fair price is 
                                                     
 162. Edwin J. Hecker Jr., The Kansas Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 68 J. KAN. B. ASSOC. 
16, 32 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 163. REVISED UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 404 cmt.5 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 164. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-103(b)(3)(ii) (2005) (explicitly authorizing this type of 
conduct). 
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ensured by requiring the self-dealing partner to demonstrate a fair merger 
price in court. 
D. The Court Should Have Required Via Christi to Demonstrate a Fair 
Merger Price Under the Strict Fairness Test to Avoid Breaching Its 
Fiduciary Duty 
The plaintiff limited partners had the burden of overcoming the 
business judgment rule by establishing that the general partner, Via 
Christi, engaged in self-dealing, an act prohibited by section 56a-
404(b)(2).  At first glance, the merger may appear analogous to the first 
dividend transaction in Singer because the plaintiff limited partners and 
Via Christi received the same value for their interests in the limited 
partnership.  If all partners received the same amount for their shares, 
Via Christi arguably did not engage in self-dealing because it did not 
receive some personal benefit to the exclusion of the other partners in the 
limited partnership.  This argument, however, rings hollow because Via 
Christi did derive personal benefit from the merger to the exclusion of 
the limited partners.  This benefit did not take the form of a larger merger 
price per share, but rather, was the continued ownership in the surviving 
entity, MRI, LLC.  Neither the plaintiffs nor the other minority limited 
partners had the right to continued ownership in MRI, LLC.  To the 
contrary, Via Christis whole purpose in orchestrating the merger 
centered on the elimination of the other limited partners ownership 
rights in MR Imaging Center.  Thus, the plaintiffs received cash for their 
shares while Via Christi received cash plus continued ownership in the 
surviving entity, MRI, LLC.  As a consequence, self-dealing existed.  
The plaintiffs carried their burden of establishing self-dealing in the 
transaction. 
With the burden shifted, Via Christi could have validated the 
transaction by establishing either that a fair price was paid for the 
plaintiffs interest or that all of the disinterested partners approved the 
transaction.  The second way of validating the transaction could not have 
been shown because all of the disinterested partners did not approve the 
merger.  Nor could Via Christi use Weinberger to shift the burden back 
to the plaintiffs and employ Weinbergers heightened requirement, 
because appraisal rights did not exist for the plaintiffs.  Therefore, Via 
Christis only available alternative should have been demonstrating that 
the plaintiffs received a fair price for their cashed-out shares. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs in Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc. sought to 
utilize the two protective devices normally employed in corporate 
squeeze-out mergers to guarantee a fair price for their cashed-out shares.  
The first device failed because no statute granting appraisal rights 
applied to the merger.  The second device, damages stemming from a 
breach of fiduciary duty, also failed to yield a judicially-determined fair 
price, but only because the Kansas Supreme Court misconstrued 
statutory provisions and misapplied corporate case law. 
A correct fiduciary duty analysis reveals that limited partners in a 
squeeze-out merger will always be guaranteed a judicially-determined 
fair merger price for their cashed-out shares.  Via Christi engaged in self-
dealing, an action prohibited by section 404(b)(2) of KUPA.  As a result, 
Via Christi should have been required to demonstrate a fair merger price 
to avoid breaching its fiduciary duty to the limited partners.  The 
heightened burden in Weinberger did not apply to the transaction 
because a judicially-determined fair merger price was not ensured 
through appraisal rights. 
The courts fiduciary duty analysis in Welch must be revisited to 
protect minority interest holders in non-corporate entities.  Welch allows 
majority interest holders more leeway to cleverly craft squeeze-out 
mergers in an effort to evade the protections afforded by a judicially-
determined merger price.  Until Welch is overturned, minority interest 
holders in non-corporate entities face the increasing chance of finding 
themselves up squeeze-out merger creek without a paddle. 
 
